Abstract-Economic demand response (DR) is intended to lower locational marginal prices (LMP) in wholesale energy markets during peak hours. DR resources are paid LMP and that cost is allocated to energy buyers. Market operators use a "net benefits test" to determine if DR is cost effective. This test identifies the LMP threshold below which DR is not cost effective; however, it cannot identify an optimal quantity of DR. Under the current net benefits test, acquisition of "all cost-effective DR" effectively results in a wealth transfer from generators to DR resources and LMPs that are no lower than without DR. Since DR, unlike energy, has no utility, this is not an ideal test of DR cost effectiveness. In this paper, we present a) an alternative method for evaluating the cost effectiveness of economic DR in wholesale markets that makes use of unique DR supply and demand curves, and b) an alternative welfare analysis methodology that identifies maximum social welfare (optimal quantity of DR). We find that because DR has no utility beyond lowering market prices, the optimal quantity of DR does not occur at market equilibrium. Rather, it occurs at the point where potential financial gain from DR is equal to dead weight losses.
I. INTRODUCTION Although it is widely accepted that there are economic benefits to price responsive loads, whether and how these resources should be compensated has been debated. FERC Order 745 requires wholesale energy markets to pay economic DR resources the full LMP. That said, several alternatives to full LMP payments have been proposed, including, "LMP-G", or LMP less the generation portion of the electricity retail rate as well as "LMP-G&T", or LMP less the generation and transmission portion of the retail rate [1] [2]. The debate surrounding price paid to DR primarily stems from questions concerning the economic efficiency of LMPbased payments. In [3] the authors argue that full LMP payments to DR in the energy market (without regard to the retail rate) constitutes a discriminatory overpayment at best and is economically inefficient at worst. In [4] , the authors examine the economic welfare of LMP and LMP-G&T payments in the PJM market. They concluded that there is a net social benefit of DR when social welfare gains (area between energy supply curve and DR supply curve) are larger than the DR incentive payment (i.e. G&T portion of the retail rate multiplied by DR quantity). In theory, the supply curve for DR is given by the marginal cost of DR. In [5] , the authors define this marginal cost of DR as "the cost society saves by declining to produce the last unit [of DR]". As part of this paper, we propose an alternative method for generating the supply curve for DR.
Independent system operators (ISOs) have for the past decade incorporated economic DR into energy markets when said resources meet the requirement of cost effectiveness (net-benefits test) [6] . This test ensures that the avoided market cost gained through DR is greater than or equal to the cost to compensate DR. This is done by determining the threshold price on a smoothed generation supply curve where the elasticity is equal to 1 [7] . Thus, cost-effectiveness of DR is not currently measured from the point of view of maximum welfare. Furthermore, DR priced at LMP effectively equates energy reduction -also called negawatts (NWh) -to energy production, or megawatt hours (MWh). However, this is not a reasonable assumption. Even if load reduction balances supply and demand just as generation increase would, DR (unlike energy) has no utility beyond market price reduction. In other words, the threshold identified by the current net benefits test is the point where all benefit of DR is lost to pay for DR. This renders the current net benefits test suboptimal.
The contribution of this paper is the development of a demand curve for DR that reflects the value of load reductions to load serving entities (LSE). This demand curve is used to determine the cost effectiveness of DR. The proposed method is agnostic to price and can be applied when DR is paid LMP or any other price. We also present a new analysis of social welfare gains and losses given the DR's unique property of providing value, but having no utility. The proposed welfare analysis identifies both optimal and costeffective DR is an improvement over the current net-benefits test as the proposed method not only ensures market benefits, but also explicitly optimizes LSE and DR providers' benefits.
II. PROPOSED DR SUPPLY AND DEMAND CURVES
The proposed methodology makes use of DR supply and demand curves based on the value created by DR actions.
A. Defining Value of DR: increased LSE gross margin
In [7] , the authors proposed pricing DR proportionally to the benefits it provides. This benefit comes in the form of increased gross margin for LSEs. The gross margin is the difference between the retail and wholesale prices multiplied by the volume of energy sold. This margin (illustrated in Figure 1 ) is maximized at an optimal load * . While wholesale prices vary with demand, retail prices are usually fixed. Because of this, at peak loads, the LSE experiences declining margins and it is during these peak hours that there is a potential for the LSE to benefit from DR as load reductions will increase margins. 
B. DR Supply and Demand Curves
Since DR reduces wholesale market prices, then LSEs would be willing to pay a price for DR that is less than or equal to the benefit that they derive from DR. In this case, that benefit of DR is an increase in gross margin (i.e. the difference between gross margin with and without DR). Then, the maximum price that a rational LSE would be willing to pay at any given hour is the change in gross margin due to DR divided by the amount of DR needed to produce said change in gross margin. This price , is given in Equation (1).
Here, * is the weighted average retail rate defined in Equation (2), , is the wholesale price on day , at hour, ℎ, when the net system load is − and , is the wholesale price on day , at hour ℎ, when the system load is . Thus, is the baseline load and is the DR cleared in the market.
Different LSEs could have different retail rates, and the potential economic value of a unit of DR would be different for each LSE -perhaps economic to some and not so to others. This method makes use of a single representative retail rate, * . It is the role of the ISO to select a rate " * " that best represents all the LSEs. In Equation (2), we approximate that rate as the load weighted retail rates of the LSEs, where is the retail rate of the LSE, and , is the local load of the LSE.
The DR supply curve can be generated by marginal bids. However, to illustrate the indifference of this method to price, we generate this curve based on the definition of DR's marginal cost given in [5] ,"the cost society saves by declining to produce the last unit [of DR]". That cost can be represented by the marginal cost of the DR provider opting to exercise its right to consume electricity. This means that starting from a baseline load, , the supply curve, , of DR, , can be approximated as the LMP when total demand is . Thus, in Equation (3), could be the supply curve based on DR price/quantity bids, but for this paper, it is the generation supply curve.
C. DR Supply and Demand Curves under FERC Order 745
For comparison, we also model the implied DR supply and demand curves under Order 745. In that case, there is a demand for DR up until the point when the cost of DR, (LMP multiplied times DR), is greater than the benefit (the change in LMP multiplied times load). This effectively defines a demand curve for DR as Equation (4) .
Since the FERC Order also sets the price of DR at full LMP, then this can be interpreted as defining the supply curve of DR to be full LMP. However, since LMP reduces with increasing DR, the DR supply curve has a negative slope and is given in Equation (5). Again, in Equation (5), is the generation supply curve.
III. PROPOSED MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS
Economic DR has no utility beyond reducing wholesale costs. An energy buyer's surplus continuously increases to market equilibrium because energy can be used. DR, however, cannot be used and it therefore is not optimal to allow DR in energy markets until the cost of DR equals the benefit of DR (at that point, the buyer has neither gained nor lost). This means that consumer surplus for a DR product cannot be accurately represented with traditional welfare analysis. To account for DR's lack of utility, we define the consumer surplus as Equation (6).
Furthermore, because economic gains from DR come at a cost, maximum social welfare no longer occurs at the intersection of supply and demand curves; rather, it occurs when the potential economic gain of DR equals the cost to procure it. This new equilibrium * * , is described in Equation (7) and is illustrated in Figure 3a and Figure 4a . Here, is the potential financial gain from DR and is the cost to procure those financial gains. = , = * *
Note that in this alternative welfare analysis is equivalent to deadweight loss in the traditional welfare analysis. In this alternative method, deadweight loss is the difference between and as given in Equation (10). The interpretation of (10) is that if is positive, then there remains economic (cost-effective) DR that could be bought.
IV.
CASE STUDY
We tested the proposed DR pricing method using a network represented by an IEEE 6-bus system. A 6-bus system allows for a simple illustration; but the method is appropriate for large systems as well. For this initial study, no transmission constraints are considered and there is a single market price at each node. The generation supply curve is determined from the cost curves of the three generators. Keeping with convention established with FERC Order 745, this generation supply curve is then approximated by a smooth curve [6] , in this case, a third order polynomial. V. RESULTS
Since each of the LSEs has a different retail rate (illustrated in Figure 2a) , they each maximize their gross margins at a different "optimal demand" (illustrated in Figure  2b ). Thus, it is the role of the wholesale market to pool DR resources and identify a system-wide optimal level of DR that maximizes the sum of all LSE gross margins. Using Equation (2), the optimal rate is ($15.2/MWh). For the proposed method, the supply and demand curves are given in Figure 3a . Here, the supply curve is based on the incremental increases in gross margin as DR increases from 0% to 60% of the peak system load. The market equilibrium is at 20% peak reduction and has a price of $33/NWh. However, social surplus is not maximized at this equilibrium. Figure 3b illustrates the change in welfare with increasing penetration of DR. Consumer surplus increases until peaking at 10% peak load reduction. Producer surplus is continuously increasing. Social surplus is maximized at 13% peak reduction, providing a value of $926 (which corresponds to a price of $27/NWh). Figure 4a presents the supply and demand curves for DR under the current Order 745 pricing method. Here, the demand curve for DR is the value of reduced market prices and the supply curve for DR is the LMP. However, for the welfare analysis, we assume that the marginal cost of DR is the threshold price, (Otherwise, the negative slope of the supply curve would result in a negative producer surplus). Based on the smooth generation supply curve in Figure 2a , this threshold price is = $9.2/ ℎ. Figure 4b illustrates the welfare analysis. Because of the decreasing slope of the market price (LMP), the producer surplus does not increase for all load reductions. Rather, the producer surplus peaks at 19% load reduction with a surplus of $476, while the consumer surplus peaks at 26% load reduction. The threshold price occurs at 56% load reduction. At this point, producer surplus, consumer surplus and social surplus are all zero.
The most notable difference between Figures 4a and 3a is that the market equilibrium in the 745 case occurs at a much higher quantity of DR and much lower price. This means that during peak periods, the proposed method places a higher value and therefore higher price on DR. However, since we assume that the cost of DR is an increasing function, the quantity at equilibrium will be lower than in the Order 745 case (which has a decreasing supply curve for DR). As for social surplus, there are two important points on Figures 3b and 4b: The quantity of DR at market equilibrium, and the quantity of DR at maximum social surplus. Ideally, these two points should be one and the same, but with DR, this is not true. That is because, while the demand curve represents the maximum price the LSE is able and willing to pay for DR, it also represents the only value of DR to the LSE (i.e. there is no utility beyond cost reductions). So at market equilibrium, the DR buyer actually gives up all benefit of DR to pay for DR. Thus, the proposed case results in a maximum social surplus of $926 at 13% load reduction and the Order 745 case results in a maximum social surplus of $1924 at 24% load reduction. Table 3 summarizes the results in Figure 3 and Figure 4 at the market equilibrium points and maximum social surplus points. In comparing the proposed DR pricing method with the current Order 745 method, we find that: 1. The proposed method has both its market equilibrium point and maximum social surplus point at lower quantities of DR than in the FERC Order 745 method (106NWh < 285NWh and 66NWh < 122NWh). 2. In terms of absolute value, the Order 745 method results in a higher social surplus. This is because the decreasing price of DR allows for larger quantities of DR. However, the currently used net benefits test does not identify this optimum; rather, it allows DR to surpass this optimal quantity until social surplus is zero (at the price threshold, ). 3. At the market equilibrium, the proposed method provides a higher social surplus. This is because the increasing value of DR allows DR to enjoy a surplus even if consumers do not. Thus, at market equilibrium, the social surplus is entirely producer surplus. Finally, Table 4 shows the distribution of costs and benefits for the various market participants when DR participates up to the point of maximum social welfare. It should be noted that the transaction costs of DR occur on the retail side of the market and are not considered here. This means that given the DR price in the wholesale market, it is the responsibility of the DR aggregator to ensure that wholesale revenues are sufficient to cover the transaction costs of DR and allow the aggregator to profit. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a method for evaluating the cost effectiveness of DR using DR supply and demand curves. The supply curve is based on the value of DR to LSEs (here defined as increased LSE gross margins). We define cost effectiveness in terms of social surplus from welfare analysis. DR is cost-effective, when social surplus is positive and increasing ( − ). This definition allows us to not only identify cost-effective DR, but also the optimal quantity of DR (maximum social surplus). Because DR has no utility beyond lowering market prices, the optimal level of DR does not occur at the intersection of supply and demand curves. Rather, it occurs at the point where potential financial gain from DR is equal to dead weight losses. Beyond this point, any additional DR simply represents a wealth transfer from generators to DR providers and the LSEs' benefits decrease. For reference, we used the proposed method to evaluate the cost effectiveness of DR using a DR supply curve based on value of DR defined by Order 745. In this case as well, the optimal cost-effective DR does not occur at market equilibrium (also known as the threshold price). This means that the current method used by ISOs to determine cost effective DR can be improved by the using proposed welfare analysis to identify the optimal, cost effective DR quantity.
VII.
